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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STRATFORD L. WENDELBOE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
...,--vs.-
RICHARD B. JACOBSON, BILLY 
JOE LANG, and JOHN H. 
DOUGLAS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9025 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In his brief the plaintiff purports to give a statement 
of the case and a statement of the facts, but in so doing 
plaintiff completely overlooks one cardinal and funda-
mental principle that has been so firmly and repeatedly 
stated by this Court as to require no citation. That prin-
ciple is that the jury by determining the issues in favor 
of defendants has found the facts of the incident to be as 
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the evidence of the defendants discloses them. The plain-
tiff repeatedly in his purported statement of the case 
and statement of the facts relies on statements of the 
plaintiff, statements of the defendants taken completely 
out of context, and in several instances, as we will point 
out later, on a misstatement of the record. 
The fact versions of what occurred in the early morn-
ing hours of April 6 that gave rise to this lawsuit were 
bitterly contested by the parties, and the defendants' 
version as against the plaintiff's version of what really 
occurred conflicted at nearly every material point. The 
facts, of course, a.re vital in this case. It is impossible 
to apply any of the law of arrest or false imprisonment 
or malicious prosecution to this case without accurately 
ascertaining just what the facts of the incident were. It 
is because the facts are of such vital importance in this 
matter that defendants believe that this Court cannot 
possibly give just consideration to this appeal unless 
those facts are set out accurately and in detail and \'lrith 
genuine references to the record. Therefore, respondents 
shall set forth the facts as they actually occurred and 
as they were found to have occurred by the jury in this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Fron1 approximately l\{arch 15 to and including April 
6, 1958, Salt Lake City had been undergoing a crime wave 
(R. 402). Chief Skousen of the Salt Lake City police 
force testified that there was an area in downtown Salt 
Lake in which there w·as and had been a particularly 
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heavy concentration of crimes committed. The locality 
of Fifth East and Second South Streets in Salt Lake City 
was in the heart of this area (R. 401). On the night of 
April 5 and the early morning hours of April 6, 1958, 
there was a special police car assigned to this area. The 
defendant officer Richard B. Jacobson was the senior 
officer in charge of this car. Chief Skousen further testi-
fied that from 11 o'clock at night until around 4 or 5 
o'clock in the morning is the time of night that the most 
serious types of crimes are committed and that he had 
given special instructions to be transmitted to the officers 
patrolling this area to very carefully check the area and 
ordered that every suspicious situation must be complete-
ly checked out (R. 403), and Officer Jacobson was in-
formed of these instructions (R. 438). 
This was the general situation that confronted the 
police officers as they commenced their patrol work and 
duties on the night of April 5 and during the early morn-
ing hours of April 6, 1958. 
t At approximately 3 o'clock A.M. on the morning 
fir; of April 6, the three defendant officers in the perform-
ance of their duties were approaching in their police car 
the intersection of Second South and Fifth East. The 
police officers were driving from the south to the north 
'Jp (R. 251). As they approached Second South while driving 
ii\) north on Fifth East, the officers noticed an old automo-
~r bile parked on the west side of Fifth East heading in a 
~~ southerly direction approximately 70 feet south of the 
~ intersection (R. 251-253, 310). At that time, on the south-
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west corner of the Second South and Fifth East intersec-
tion there was a service station under construction, and 
there was a construction shed full of tools, equipment, etc. 
near the place where the automobile was parked (R. 
435). As the officers drove by, they noticed that the 
lights of the automobile were out and that the engine was 
running (R. 317, 419). After first observing the automo-
bile, the officers continued on across Second South driv-
ing in a northerly direction and proceeded to check out a 
service station and other buildings in the area, and then 
they checked out the Grand Central Store located west of 
Fifth East on the south side of Second South. They then 
drove out the back and south end of the Grand Central 
Parking Lot on to Fifth East again and turned back to 
the north. 
At this time, they noticed that the automobile was 
still parked in the position observed a few minutes be-
fore (R. 316-317). They then drove up to the parked car 
and parked the police car parallel to the automobile and 
a few feet east of it so that the police car was heading 
north and the plaintiff's automobile was heading south. 
Officer Jacobson thereupon got out of the police car and 
went over to the parked car and observed the plaintiff 
was sitting at the wheel and that the motor was indeed 
running and that there were no keys in the ignition lock 
(R. 317). Officer Jacobson then asked in a courteous 
manner the occupant, who was the plaintiff, for identifi-
cation or a driver's license. Plaintiff said absolutely 
nothing. He produced a temporary driving permit and 
handed it to Offirer Jacobson (R. 254-258). Officer Jacob-
> > 
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son looked at the temporary permit and since he did not 
consider it reliable identification because there was 
nothing on it but a name and address and no physical 
description of the bearer (R. 412), he asked for additional 
identification and the registration certificate for the car. 
At this time Officer Jacobson noticed that there was no 
registration certificate on the steering column of the car 
or elsewhere (R. 436). Plaintiff thereupon pulled a 
large stack of cards and other papers from a wallet and 
began thumbing through them. As he did so Officer J ac-
obson noticed the corner of what he recognized as an army 
identification card because of its pinkish border. He 
stated to the plaintiff that the army identification card 
would be excellent identification. Thereupon the plaintiff, 
still without saying a word, deliberately flipped by the 
army identification card (R. 256, 311, 312). This rather 
unusual conduct began to alert the further suspicions of 
Officer Jacobson, and he thereupon asked the plaintiff 
to step outside the automobile because he thought perhaps 
it might be someone else's army identification card or 
that plaintiff had made an obvious attempt to cover it 
up, and Officer Jacobson did not know who he was (R. 
312). 
Officer Jacobson at this point then asked the Plain-
tiff W endelboe what he was doing there at that time of 
morning and what his business was, and plaintiff there-
upon replied, "That it was none of your damn business. 
That he was a citizen, and he had his rights,'' (R. 257, 
329, 354). Officer Jacobson thereupon continued to ask 
plaintiff for his identification and stated that they 
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definitely wanted that identification and that they defin-
itely wanted to know what plaintiff was doing (R. 258). 
Thereupon Officer Jacobson asked plaintiff to be seated 
in the rear seat of the police car. But first the officers 
directed the plaintiff to place his hands on top of the 
police car, and Officer Jacobson quickly patted plaintiff 
down as a preliminary precaution against weapons (R. 
323). Plaintiff was not searched at this time, and the 
patting down was only for the purpose of determining 
whether the person had a weapon before placing him in 
the back seat of the police car (R. 378). Once in the police 
car, Officer Jacobson sat down in the front seat and told 
plaintiff he was either going to identify himself with the 
car and produce the registration certificate or he was 
going to jail (R. 267, 320). Plaintiff just sat in the seat 
of the car and said and did absolutely nothing. There-
upon Officer Jacobson informed plaintiff that he was 
under arrest for failing to produce that identification and 
that registration of that car and told him that if he didn't 
bring it out he was going to jail (R. 324). He also told 
plaintiff that he could be arrested for vagrancy (R. 313, 
316, and 324). 
When the plaintiff still refused to answer or to say a 
single word, Officer Jacobson put in a call to the dis-
patcher to impound the car (R. 269), and plaintiff still 
said nothing. 
Officer Jacobson and Reserve Trainee Douglas then 
went over to the parked autmnobile and began to 
examine it. Officer Jacobson becan1e aware of a commo-
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tion behind him and turned around and saw that plaintiff 
was trying to get out of the police car, and Officer Lang 
was holding him in (R. 271). Officer Jacobson told Lang 
to let him out and that perhaps now he would tell them 
what he was doing there and who he was. At this time 
Officers Jacobson and Douglas were standing by the side 
of plaintiff's car. As Officer Lang released the door of 
the police car, plaintiff came directly out of the police 
car at a high rate of speed and knocked both officers aside 
(R. 318). He forcibly pushed Officer Jacobson aside with 
a movement of his arm across Officer Jacobson's chest 
(R. 273, 334, and 339). This conduct, of course, amounted 
to an obvious battery by the plaintiff on the person of 
Officer Jacobson. At this point Officer Lang caught one 
arm 3:nd Officer Jacobson the other arm of the plaintiff 
and started him back toward the police car ( R. 27 4). The 
plaintiff then attempted to break away from the officers 
and a scuffle ensued. Plaintiff had one arm loose swing-
ing it around and at that point Officer Jacobson struck 
the plaintiff on the chin in an effort to bring him under 
control. This blow had no effect whatever on the plain-
tiff and seemed to rile him more and resulted in increased 
efforts of the plaintiff to break from the custody of the 
officers (R. 276). Reserve Officer Douglas was not par-
ticipating in the struggle at all (R. 277), and never took 
any affirmative action against plaintiff. 
Officers Lang and Jacobson managed to get ahold 
of plaintiff again and Officer Jacobson was able to snap 
a handcuff on one wrist (R. 278). The plaintiff got the 
arm and wrist free and began wildly flailing his arm 
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about, and at that point Officer Jacobson was cut by the 
loose handcuff quite a little bit (R. 463). It was at thi~ 
point and not before that Officer Lang hit plaintiff with 
his flashlight. The Officer hit the plaintiff a maximum 
of two or three times (R. 335, 364, 365). These blows 
with the flashlight were not hard or anywhere near as 
hard as Officer Lang could hit, and he had no intention 
to injure the plaintiff only get him under control (R. 380). 
It is perfectly obvious that these blows with the flash-
light were of no severity at all, and the best possible proof 
I 
of this fact is the photographs "Exhibits 2, 3, and 6" in-
troduced by the plaintiff at the trial and which photo-
graphs clearly illustrate the minor, superficial nature of 
the contact from the flashlight. At this point in the 
scuffle, Officer Jacobson managed to get behind the plain-
tiff and apply a perfectly harmless and effective hold 
with his arm underneath the plaintiff's chin, which hold 
renders a person off balance and momentarily cuts off 
the blood supply to the head making him groggy. As 
Officer Jacobson applied the hold to the plaintiff, the 
officer was able to snap the other handcuff on to plain-
tiff's other hand, and at that point all physical activity 
of the officers toward plaintiff ceased (R. 381), and plain-
tiff was lowered to the ground, and except for a 1noment 
of dizziness, the plaintiff fron1 this point on during the 
entire evening was c01npletel~,. conscious and observant of 
everything that was going on around hiln although from 
that time on during the evening the plaintiff faked un-
consciousness and injury as it suited his convenience (R. 
290, 387). 
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A police ambulance within a moment or two appeared 
on the scene. Plaintiff was examined and pronounced 
not injured, and because he refused to walk or talk be-
cause he didn't want to (R. 126), the officers picked him 
up and placed him on the rear seat of the police car. From 
I 
this point on through the entire evening, plaintiff never 
would walk or stand up, requiring the officers to lift and 
carry him about from place to place as will be seen. Upon 
arriving at the jail, the officers decided to take plaintiff 
to the County Hospital for examination (R. 284-286). At 
the hospital Officer Jacobson requested a blood alcohol 
test in order to determine if plaintiff was drunk, since 
he was at a loss to account for plaintiff's actions (R. 288 
et. seq.). Officer Jacobson then left the plaintiff at the 
County Hospital and went up to the Latter-day Saints 
Hospital to have his hand examined which had been in-
jured in his scuffle with the plaintiff. 
Other officers rehandcuffed the plaintiff at the 
County Hospital and returned him to the City Jail for 
booking. At the time of the booking, Officers Jacobson, 
Lang, and Douglas had returned from the Latter-day 
Saints Hospital and were present. 
From the time that the handcuffs were placed on 
plaintiff at the scene until he was returned to the City 
Jail for booking, he intermittently faked unconscious-
ness and only aroused himself to swear at the officers 
(R. 290). Plaintiff again required the officers to carry 
him into the jail by the booking pen, and he refused to 
stand or talk, so he was laid down on the floor (R. 291, et. 
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seq.). At this point, the custody of the plaintiff was 
turned over from the arresting officers to the booking 
officers and jailer. The officer in charge was Harvey 
Roach assisted by Larry D. Lunnen, and these officers 
made the decision and determined what was to be done 
with plaintiff from that point on (R. 426). 
Plaintiff refused to give the booking officers any in-
formation at all. He refused to state his name, and he 
refused to get up; he just stubbornly lay on the floor, 
although he was not really injured at all. The only thing 
he did at the jail was to call for newspapermen, lawyers, 
etc. (R. 291). 
Because of several attempts at suicide in the City 
Jail, Chief Skousen had given express instructions (R. 
405) to the jailers, which instructions were in effect April 
6, 1958, that any individual who was behaving in an ab-
normal manner or appeared to be mentally depressed 
must be stripped of his clothing and placed in an isolation 
cell so that he would not injure hin1self. The determina-
tion to follow this procedure ·with plaintiff \Yas decided 
upon by Officers Roach and Lunnen and no one else (R. 
426), although the defendants helped to carry plaintiff 
downstairs to the cell when he still refused to walk (R. 
295), and Officer Jacobson assisted Officer Roach some-
what in removing clothes although Officer Roach re-
moved most the clothing, and Officer Roach also filled 
· out the booking sheet listing the plaintiff as J olm Doe 
(R. 427). By this tin1e it was approximately 6 o'clock 
A.M. (R. 217). Approximately 2lh hours later, Officer 
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\' Merrill, after having previously offered breakfast to the 
~~ plaintiff, returned to his cell to obtain information for 
ITG the booking sheet, and he at that time asked plaintiff if 
ltd~ he wanted an attorney and was given telephone numbers 
ij,t by the plaintiff which he called (R. 421, ':!:22). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS SET FORTH IN AP-
PELLANT'S BRIEF DISCLOSES NO MER.TT THERETO 
AND A COMPLETE MISICONCEPTION OF 'THE FACTS AND 
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE, AND PLAINTIFF 
WAS LEGALLY ARRESTED BY DEFENDANTS AFTER AND 
ONLY AFTER HE HAD COMMIT'TED NOT ONLY ONE BUT 
SEVERAL MISDEMEANORS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE 
OFFICERS. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT RECEIVE A SEVERE BEATING 
OR ANYTHING APPROACHING IT AND WAS ONLY SUPER-
FICIALLY INJURED IN THE LAWFUL EFFORTS OF THE 
DEFENDANT OFFICERS TO RETAIN HIM IN CUSTODY. 
POINT III 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE 'THIRD CAUSE OF AC-
TION FOR MALI,CIOUS PROSECUTION SHOULD NOT LIE 
AGAINST 'THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE, AND IN ANY 
EVENT, THE FAICTS AND EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY DE-
FENDANTS AT THE TRIAL CLEARLY ES'TABLISHED A 
DE'FENSE TO ANY SUCH CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THE 
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT ERRONEOUS. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 'THE DE-
FENDANTS IS NOT SUFFICIEN'T UNDER 'THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AND IN VIEW OF THE APPLICABLE LAW 
APPLIED BY THE COURT BELOW. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO RESERVE OFFICER DOUG-
LAS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS SET FORTH IN AP-
PELLANT'S BRIEF DISCLOSES NO MERI'T THERETO 
AND A COMPLETE MISCONCEPTION OF THE FACTS AND 
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO TI-llS CASE, AND PLAINTIFF 
WAS LEGALLY ARRESTED BY DEFENDANTS AFTER AND 
ONLY AFTER HE HAD COMMITTED NOT ONLY ONE BUT 
SEVERAL MISDEMEANORS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE 
OFFICERS. 
Plaintiff's brief sets forth nine points which we will 
now briefly discuss in the order in which those points 
are presented in the plaintiff's and appellant's brief. 
Plaintiff's Point I 
Plaintiff claims in this point that there is little dis-
pute as to the actual facts concerning the false arrest and 
imprisonment count. An examination of the facts set 
forth above show that this is not so. 
At the trial, plaintiff insistently attempted to put 
over the false notion that for son1e reason the Defendant 
Reserve Trainee Douglas was being instructed in how to 
perform arrests and that plaintiff was badly treated for 
the special benefit of Defendant Douglas. Nothing could 
he further from the truth. The Defendant Douglas was 
not an inexperienced recruit or anything like it. He had 
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completely finished his schooling as a reserve officer and 
had been graduated from his class March 25, 1958 (R. 
325), although he was not actually sworn in as a reserve 
officer until April 16, 1958. Defendant Officer Lang 
expressly testified that they were not trying to give Doug-
las any lessons (R. 362) and that he was just along on a 
routine evening of police work. Officer Jacobson testified 
that Defendant Douglas had been along with him on 
many occasions (R. 410), and the attempt by plaintiff 
both at trial and in his brief to imply that there was any 
improper conduct for the benefit of Douglas is totally 
unwarranted. 
Plaintiff states at Page 34 of his brief that he was 
not resentful and was willing to comply. As a matter of 
truth, from the very first time that the officers approach-
ed plaintiff in the lawful exercise of their duties, plaintiff 
was belligerent, surly, and interfered with their lawful in-
quiries as to what he was doing there and everything 
he did delayed and obstructed them (R. 379). 
Plaintiff in his brief repeatedly states that he was 
forced to put his hands on top of the police car and was 
searched when such is not the fact. The truth of the mat-
ter is that before plaintiff was requested to sit in the back 
seat of the police car, he was briefly and quickly patted 
down for the purpose of seeing whether or not he was 
carrying any weapons (R. 323). Certainly there is noth-
ing illegal about this procedure, and in view of the fact 
that a police officer in circumstances such as existed here 
can expect almost anything, common sense would dictate 
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that police officers exercise this elementary caution. 
There is absolutely no truth to the claim on Page 36 of 
plaintiff's brief that when plaintiff left the police car all 
he wanted to do was talk to the officers and try to con-
vince them not to impound his car. The jury has found, 
as set forth in the statement of facts above, that the truth 
of the matter is that the plaintiff burst out of the police 
car at a high rate of speed and knocked against both 
Officers Jacobson and Lang in an apparent attempt to 
get in his car or to leave the area (R. 318). 
Defendants do not dispute that an arrest for a mis-
demeanor can ·only be made upon a warrant or for an 
offense committed in the presence of the arresting officer. 
Certainly this is a correct statement of the law, and these 
defendant officers were fully aware of that fact. By 
attempting to insist over and over again that he was false-
ly arrested, plaintiff merely begs the question. The facts 
are that he conrmitted several offenses directly in the 
presence of the officers and when he was placed under 
arrest in the rear seat of the police car he was specifically 
informed by Officer Jacobson that he was being placed 
under arrest and what for (R. 417). 
The two prin1ary offenses, besides the assault and 
battery upon the officers, and the attempted escape, were 
plaintiff's wilfull failure and refusal to display a regis-
tration card and resisting and obstructing the officers. 
Plaintiff repeated})~ failed and refused to produce 
the registration certificate to the defendant officers after 
the smne had been requested frmn hin1 and de1nanded 
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from him. Section 41-1-40 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, provides that the registration card shall at all times 
be carried either in the vehicle or upon the person driving 
or in control of such vehicle, uwho shall dvsplay the same 
upon demand of a police officer or any officer or employee 
of the department." Section 41-1-142(K), Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, makes it a misdemeanor for any person 
to violate the provisions of the aforementioned section. 
The city ordinances follow the statute identically. The rec-
ord shows without question that Officer Jacobson repeat-
edly requested and demanded this registration certificate 
in connection with his overall attempt to ascertain plain-
tiff's connection with the automobile, and plaintiff 
persistently refused and failed to produce the same. In 
fact when he was finally arrested in the back seat of the 
police car, he still said absolutely nothing when Officer 
Jacobson told him that he was being placed under arrest 
for refusing to display the registration certificate, to 
identify himself, and refusing to give a legitimate busi-
ness for being there at that time of night (R. 320, 417). 
At every point in the proceedings, the plaintiff obvi-
ously wilfully resisted, delayed, and obstructed Officer 
Jacobson in violation of Section 76-28-54 Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. This point will be discussed later in con-
nection with plaintiff's Point II. 
The Revised Ordinances, 1955, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Section 32-1-52 define vagrancy. Sub-section 5 thereof 
states that every idle person is a vagrant and Section 6 
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thereunder provides that every person who wanders 
about the streets at late or unusual hours of the night 
without any visible or lawful business is a vagrant. It 
seems perfectly apparent that the officers had every 
right and duty to determine whether or not plaintiff was 
indeed idle upon the streets of Salt Lake City without 
any visible or lawful business, for he certainly appeared 
to be. Whether or not he actually was a vagrant is a 
little beside the point because the only way a police 
officer could tell whether or not a person had a lawful 
business or was idle would be to ask him and without 
becoming involved in the question of whether or not the 
plaintiff was under a duty to answer such a question, it 
certainly seems apparent that he had no right to reply 
that it was "None of the officers damn business." Per-
haps the plaintiff might have said, "I stand on Consti-
tutional grounds and refuse to answer," but he did not, 
and as we shall point out later, by his action and in his 
state1nents he obstructed and delayed Officer Jacobson 
in the exercise of what certainly was the officer's legiti-
mate duty, namely to ascertain what business the plain-
tiff was up to at that late hour of the night in the 
f'xtremel~· unusual and suspicious circumstances of sit-
tin~ in a parked autonwbile with the lights out, the motor 
running-, no ke~·s in the ignition, and right next to a con-
s1 ruction shed at the scene (R. 317, -±:15). If the plaintiff 
l1ad ntad(\ <'YPn the slightest effort to produce the regis-
tration to the nutmnobile as he was under a duty to do, 
quite probably the entire incident would have ended here, 
and the plain tiff could have gone on his way. But the 
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plaintiff admitted himself (R. 197, 198) that he never even 
told the officer that he had a registration, that he never 
even told him his name, that he never even said I'm an 
army officer or a cab driver, and certainly by his own ad-
missions alone and by the positive statements of defend-
ant officers, he clearly committed an offense and misde-
meanor in the presence of the officers by failing to pro-
duce the registration certificate, and this was not a minor 
or technical point. The way the situation was developing, 
Officer Jacobson had every reasonable right to begin to 
form the belief that perhaps this was a stolen car, and he 
certainly would have been derelic~ in his duty if he had 
not continued to investigate the situation. 
The striking thing about this entire case and inci-
dent is the way the whole matter developed point by point 
8olely and completely as a result of the defiant and bellig-
erent attitude of the plaintiff and in his total refusal to 
produce his registration or say anything about it or state 
what he was doing in the area under those highly unusual 
circumstances. Therefore, it seems clear beyond any 
shadow of a doubt that before any struggle or scuffle 
whatever ensued, the Plaintiff W endelboe was under law-
ful arrest in the back seat of that police car. Indeed, he 
himself stated that he submitted to being put in the car 
(R. 195) and was confined therein (R. 196), although he 
denied the final chance that Officer Jacobson gave him to 
produce his registration (R. 417). Certainly in view of 
these facts, there was no error in the Court's failure 
to grant plaintiff's requested Instruction No.6 to instruct 
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the jury that in this connection plaintiff was falsely ar-
rested. 
Plaintiff's Point II 
Plaintiff maintains that Instruction No. 7 is contrary 
to law. It is difficult to understand plaintiff's position 
on this Instruction. The Instruction follows the language 
identically of Section 41-1-40, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
which Section clearly requires that a person display and 
show the registration certificate to a police officer upon 
demand. Whether or not the registration is attached in-
side the vehicle or upon the person is not of particular im-
portance. The vital point is that a police officer in the 
performance of his duty quite often must determine the 
connection a person in a vehicle has with the ownership 
of such vehicle. There is no need in this case to be con-
cerned with any supposed inconsistency between Section 
41-1-40 and Section 41-1-142 in connection ·with the point 
as to whether or not the registration must be attached 
inside the autonwbile or may be carried on the person, 
because the Salt Lake City Ordinance is clear and manda-
tory. The Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1955, in Title 46, designated the "Traffic Code," at Sec-
tion 179 thereof provide that the registration certificate 
"shall at all times be carried in the vehicle to which it re-
fers or shall be carried by the person driving or in control 
of such vehicle who shall display the san1e upon demand 
of a police officer.'' 
Plaintiff then further makes the c01nplete misstate-
rnent in Page 42 of his brief that the evidence is uncontra-
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dieted that Mr. Wendelboe did not either fail or refuse to 
display his registration certificate. Nothing could be 
further from the truth; as we have already seen by ap-
propriate citations to the record, Officer Jacobson 
repeatedly requested and demanded that plaintiff dis-
play the registration certificate; first when he was still 
in his automobile (and even the plaintiff doesn't deny 
this) (R. 195, 196), next outside the plaintiff's automobile, 
and finally in the back 'seat of the police car before Offi-
cer Jacobson stated to the plaintiff that he was under ar-
rest (R. 320, 417), and in this connection note that when 
Officer Jacobson talked to Mr. Melvin Morris, the City 
Prosecutor, soon after the incident, Mr. Morris testified 
that at that time Officer Jacobson told him that plaintiff 
had failed to produce the registration (R. 449). 
There can be no question at all in this case that the 
plaintiff absolutely failed and refused to display his 
registration certificate, and from his belligerent and de-
fiant attitude and his refusal to say one word, particular-
ly in the back seat of the police car, it is quite obvious 
that, either he had no intention of displaying the same, 
or what is more probably the truth, that in fact he had 
no registration certificate either on his person or in the 
vehicle, because Officer Jacobson never did see the regis-
tration certificate at any time (R. 256), and Officer Larry 
D. Lunnen who looked through plaintiff's wallet at the jail 
did not see or find plaintiff's registration certificate 
(R. 427). The omnibus penalty provision, Section 41-1-
142, (K) thereof clearly makes it a misdemeanor for any 
person to violate any of the provisions of this Act, and 
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Section 41-1-40 is a provision of the Act referred to. 
Plaintiff claims that the Instruction is contrary to 
law, argumentative, confusing and tends to comment on 
the evidence. 53 American Jurisprudence at Page 475, 
Section 602 states as follows: 
"* * * it is generally not deemed to be an in-
vasion of the province of the jury for the trial 
judge, in his discretion, in charging the jury to 
sum up the facts in the case or state the evidence. 
Instructions which are in the nature of .a resume of 
the evidence and argument do not constitute re-
versible error unless so unfair to the appellant as 
to have prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury." 
In this case it was vital because of the nature of 
the law of arrest that the jury be able to determine at 
what time plaintiff was subject to lawful arrest or in 
other words at what point his conduct amounted to an 
offense or misdemeanor corrnnitted in the presence of the 
arresting officer because there is no dispute whatever 
that an officer, or any other person for that matter, ar-
resting without a warrant for a misdemeanor must have 
the offense committed in his presence. 
State v. A.nselmo, 148 Pac. 1071 ( 46, Utah 137) de-
cided by this Court in 1915 clearly states the law and the 
Court's duties on instructions when the law of arrest is 
involved. Under headnotes 5 and 6 at Page 1075 in the 
Pacific Reporter this Court states : 
"The decisions of the Courts are practically 
unanimous that whether an officer "~as authorized 
to make an arrest, or whether the arrest was law-
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ful or unlawful, when the facts are not in dispute, 
is a question of law for the Court. Where, how-
ever, the facts are in dispute and while the ques-
tion on a given set of facts is still one of law, yet 
the jury must find the facts, and the Court charge 
them in specific terms under what state of particu-
lar facts, when found, an arrest is lawful or other-
wise." 
This is exactly what the Court did in Instruction No. 
7 and also Instruction No. 17 to be discussed later, and it 
is submitted that unless instructions are framed this way, 
the jury could not possibly determine under contraverted 
facts whether or not the arrest was lawful. 
Entirely apart from the fact that the plaintiff had 
been resisting and obstructing the officers in their lawful 
duty to investigrute the unusual and suspicious circum-
stances of the plaintiff's presence at that time of night in 
his automobile parked with the lights off, motor running, 
and no keys in the ignition - there can be no dispute 
under the facts in this case that the plaintiff clearly fail-
ed and refused to display the registration certificate ac-
cording to the mandate of the statute. 
Plaintiff's Point III 
Instruction No. 17 to which plaintiff objects is based 
upon the following statutes: 
10-6-66 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, concerning pow-
ers and duties of police officers, and the Salt Lake City 
Ordinance which is identical, to wit: Revised Ordinances, 
1955, Salt Lake City, 30-1-18. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
Section 76-28-54 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
is the state statute on resisting or obstructing officers. 
Section 32-1-31 Revised Ordinances, 1955, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, which is the City Ordinance on interfering 
with an officer. 
State v. Sandman, 4 Utah (2d) 69, 286 Pac. (2d), 
1060. 
Section 10-6-66, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the 
identical Salt Lake City Ordinance provide that it "shall 
be the duty of the police force in any city at all times to 
preserve the common peace, prevent crime, detect and 
arrest offenders, *** enforce every law relating to the 
oppression of offenses, and perform all duties enjoined 
upon them by ordinance." 
Section 10-6-67 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, says 
that police officers "shall have power and authority with-
out process to arrest and take into custody any person 
who shall comm1t or threaten or attempt to commit in the 
presence of such officer, or within his vision, any breach 
of the peace or any offense directly prohibited by th8 
laws of this state or by any ordinance. 
It will be observed that both these statutes use the 
1nandrutory word "shall" have certain duties, etc., in con-
nection with their description of the duties of police offi-
cers to prevent and detect crime; and the n1andatory 
"shall" further states that police officers shall perform 
these duties at all times. Therefore, Instruction No. 17 
wherein jt states that police officers and the defendants 
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in this case had the positive and absolute duty to investi-
gate any circumstances or situations, etc. does nothing 
more than set forth the mandatory direction of the stat-
utes because the duty is positive and absolute and such 
duty must be performed at all times. 
On the night in question, these police officers were 
engaged in performing that part of police work which oc-
cupies most of the working hours of any police officer. 
The solving of committed crimes and the arresting of per-
sons who are actually committing a crime is but a small 
part of the police officer's duties when compared with 
the amount of time that he spends patrolling, investigat-
ing, detecting, and endeavoring to prevent crime. That is 
exactly what these police officers were doing in the early 
morning hours of April 6, 1958. They were patrolling a 
very bad area in Salt Lake, an area in which there had 
been recent outbreaks of serious crimes. To say that the 
automobile of the plaintiff parked at 3 A.M. in the morn-
ing near a construction tool shed on property under con-
struction, with the lights out, the motor running, and no 
keys in the ignition, did not present a situation that these 
officers were under an absolute duty to investigate seems 
absurd. This automobile was parked in that fashion in a 
very bad area crimewise, but suppose the automobile had 
been parked anywhere else in Salt Lake City at that time 
Of~night under those circumstances-a residential area. for 
example-certainly even then it would have been the abso-
lute duty of these police officers to stop and investigate 
those circumstances in connection with their mandatory 
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duty to prevent and detect crime and at all times preserve 
the public peace. So when the Instruction sets forth that 
if the defendants had a reasonable suspicion upon reason-
able grounds whatever that plaintiff sitting in the parked 
automobile in question as appears from the evidence (and 
this part of the evidence is not in dispute or denied even 
by plaintiff) might be committing any offense or might be 
about to commit any offense, and states that the defend-
ants had the power and the authority and the absolute 
duty to approach the plaintiff and ask him what he was 
doing at that time and place, said Instruction correctly 
states the law. That is the only possible way that the offi-
cers could determine whether or not the plaintiff was or 
was not idle upon the streets of Salt Lake City at late and 
unusual hours of the night without any apparent or law-
ful business. To argue whether the plaintiff was or was 
not a vagrant at that time, more or less begs the question. 
A very interesting and pertinent case on this point is one 
by the Supreme Court of Washington under a vagrancy 
statute identical with the vagrancy statute of the state of 
Utah and Salt Lake City, Utah. That decision is: 
State v. Grenz, 175 Pac. (2d) 633. The Court states 
on Page 637 of the Pacific Reporter the following: 
"A continuous or habitual wandering about 
the streets at late or unusual hours of the night 
is not required to constitute vagrancy as here 
charged. The obvious intent of the legislature 
in enacting subdivision 8 of the vagrancy statute 
was to enable law enforcement officers to keep 
the streets clear, at late and unusual hours of the 
night, of those persons who, by reason of being 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
bent upon serious mischief, theft, or burglary, 
have no visible or lawful business or mission in 
the locality." 
Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 91 at Page 783 states 
the following: 
"On the other hand, when one's wandering 
and conduct on the streets at a late or unusual 
hour is such as to give reasonable grounds for the 
belief that his purpose in being on the street is 
not a legitimate one, the law may validly require 
that he be called on to account for his actions and 
may deem his failure to give a good account as 
proof that his purpose on the street is. not a legi-
timate one." 
The only possible way a police officer could ever deter-
mine whether a person apparently idle upon the streets 
at late and unusual hours has lawful business is to ask 
him, and it seems to us that it is no burden whatsoever 
and violates and infringes on no Constitutional right 
whatever to require a citizen who might find himself in 
such circumstances to decently inform the police officer 
just what his business was there at that time and place. 
It would be a fine state of affairs if every potential bur-
glar or other person observed upon the streets of Salt 
Lake City .at late and unusual hours of the· night under 
highly suspicious circumstances could tell the police offi-
cer that it was "None of their damn business what they 
were doing there." This plaintiff was determined to re-
sist and obstruct and delay these officers in the exercise 
of their lawful duties from the very first time that he was 
approached by Officer Jacobson. In the first place he 
didn't even answer the request of Officer Jacobson for his 
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driver's license, merely handed him the temporary permit 
(R. 254). In the second place, he deliberately flipped 
past the army identification card that Officer Jacobson 
had noticed and asked to see (R. 311) without saying a 
word. In the third place, he did not produce his registra-
tion card, and in the fourth place after Officer Jacobson 
directed him to step out of his automobile and asked him 
what he was doing there at that time and place, the plain-
tiff defiantly answered, "It is none of your damn busi-
ness," (R. 257, 329, and 354). This conduct it is obvious 
was wilful. The provisions of 76-28-54 provide as follows: 
"Every person who wilfully resists, delays, or 
obstructs any public officer in discharging or at-
tempting to discharge any duty of his office shall 
be punished by a fine of $1,000.00 or by an im-
prisonment in the County Jail not exceeding one 
year or by both." 
The plaintiff in those circumstances certainly could 
have been a vagrant. Any reasonable person n1ight have 
expected him of that, let alone a police officer. He might 
have been a lookout assisting son1e other person bent 
on mischief .at the service station under construction or 
the Grand Central Store next door, and an officer who 
is under a positive and m.andatory duty to prevent crime 
and detect crime who failed to investigate such a situa-
tion would certainly be derelict in his duties in the ex-
treme. The 1949 edition of Y\T ebster's N e\Y Collegiate 
Dictionary based on \Y ebster's New International Dic-
tionary Second Edition says that .. detect" 1neans to 
uncover or reveal or to discover the existence or presence 
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or fact of sOinething hidden or obscure, and if police 
officers have a duty to detect crime they certainly have 
a right and a positive duty to uncover, reveal, or discover 
the existence or presence of any fact which might show 
that .a public offense of any kind was being committed 
or was about to be committed, and that is exactly what 
Instruction No. 17 told the jury. The Instruction does 
not give the officers any blank check or "Gestapo" tech-
niques. It very expressly says that }he circumstances 
must be reasonably suspicious or unubal or the circum-
stances must suggest to them a reasonable possibility 
that a public offense was being committed before they 
can investigate. The claim that this Instruction is con-
trary to the Bill of Rights and could conceivably be the 
orders to a "Gestapo" unit in a police state is completely 
ridiculous. In the first place, this jury under the In-
struction decided whether or not the officers' investiga-
tion was reasonable under the circumstances of the case. 
What greater safeguard could any person anywhere 
have against "Gestapo" police than a requirement that 
a jury of his peers minutely examine every action of 
the officers through four full days of trial and then 
determine whe,ther the initial investigation itself was 
reasonable under the circumstances. Instruction No. 17 
does no more than this. The Instruction further states 
that no person has any right whatsoever to resist, inter-
fere with, obstruct or delay a police officer, and this 
language is taken identically from the statute. The In-
struction then states that if such a person wvlfully does 
or says anything which resists, interferes with, delays 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
or obstructs a police officer in the legal exercise of hi::; 
duties then such person is guilty of a crime and a public 
offense. We have already seen from the citation to 
State vs. Anselmo supra at 148 Pac. 1075, that this type 
of an Instruction which sets forth the facts which con-
stitute an offense is proper. 
This is not a case where officers took a person into 
custody to investigate him. This is not a case where a 
person was searched or arrested before any offense was 
committed. This is a case wherein the plaintiff placed 
himself in highly suspicious and unusual circumstances 
late at night and then wilfully obstructed, resisted, and 
delayed police officers performing their duty, violated 
the registration law, swore at the officers, assaulted 
them, and finally ended up in jail where he belonged. 
The claim that he stopped to buy a paper seems 
completely ridiculous since the evidence is clear that he 
was parked some 70 feet south from the place where the 
newspaper stand was (R. 253, 310), and also in view of 
the fact that he had already bought himself one paper 
earlier in the evening (R. 167), and also in view of the 
fact that there was a paper stand right outside the door 
of the place where he worked (R. 166 et. seq., 169, 221.), 
and particularly in view of the fact that he never men-
tioned the newspaper story according to Officer Jacobson 
or anyone else until he was down at the hospital. (R. 434). 
At 48 American Law Reports Annotated, Page 7 4G, 
there is a very interesting annotation on what constitutes 
the offense of obstructing or resisting an officer. The 
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American Law Reports Blue Book of supplemental de-
cisions discloses that no less than 70 cases have been 
decided since the original annotation. Among those cases 
cited is the Utah case of State vs. Sandman, 4 Utah (2d) 
69, 286 Pac. 1060. Respondents have read every one of 
those cases therein cited, and none of those cases is as 
pertinent or as clearly reasoned in connection with the 
problem here under consideration as the case of State vs. 
Sandman decided by this Court in 1955. The Court says 
that the elements of resisting and obstructing are as 
follows: 
A. A duly constituted public officer. Of this ele-
ment there can he no question in this case. 
B. Eng.aged in the performance of an official duty. 
It should certainly be clear beyond doubt that the defend-
ants were engaged in the performance and official duties 
in stopping and investigating and looking into the cir-
cumstances presented by the plaintiff in his automobile 
on Fifth East near Second South on the night in question. 
C. Was obstructed or resisted by the person in 
question. Decisions dealing directly with the law apply-
ing to an officer when he is investigating and performing 
his duty before any crime may have actually been com-
mitted are rare, and this is a surprising thing because as 
we have seen, most police work, in the point of time 
spent at least, involves this very process. This Court in 
a clear and far reaching statement of the law cuts through 
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much confusion and obscurity on this point and states 
simply and clearly as follows: 
"Such interference or resistance need not be in the 
form of physical force or violence, but it is sufficient 
that there be some direct action amounting to affirmative 
interference," and this is exactly what Instruction No. 17 
informed the jury that they must find against the plain-
tiff before they could find that he committed an offense 
when the Instruction says that if he wilfully resists, in-
terferes with, delays or obstructs a police officer in the 
legal exercise of his duties, then such person at that 
moment by such statement or conduct itself is guilty of 
a crin1e and public offense. On the facts of this case, it 
seems clear beyond dispute that the plaintiff was surly, 
belligerent, defiant, and obstructed, delayed, and resisted 
these officers at every point in the entire incident from 
the time they first made the lawful request and inquiry 
with respect to his registration and his business there 
until the time that he attempted to break from lawful 
custody and committed .an assault and battery on the 
officers and continuously through the entire evening right 
up through the booking process at the jail. There was 
no excuse or rhy1ne or reason for the plaintiff's conduct 
and affirmative actions and state1nents in this case 
unless he was in fact trying to actually cover up some 
illegal activity that he was engaged in. 
Plaintiff's Point IV 
Plaintiff states on Page 51 of his brief that it appears 
from the evidence that he was unn1ercifully beaten. This 
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statement is so completely untrue that respondents will 
discuss the matter under their own Point II at Page 36 
in this brief. 
Plaintiff further complains of Instruction No. 8 and 
insists that the Court should have directed a verdict on 
the cause of action for assault and battery for the plain-
tiff. The entire basis for this argument seems to be the 
assumption by plaintiff that he was not lawfully arrested. 
Respondents' position on this matter has already been 
stated in this brief. If we assume that the plaintiff was 
lawfully under arrest in the back seat of the police car 
before the altercation ever started, then certainly the 
only question left to consider is whether or not plaintiff 
attempted to remove himself from this custody and forci-
bly enter the automobile and leave the area, and if he 
did make such an attempt, whether reasonable force 
under the circumstances was used by the respondent 
officers to prevent him from so doing. 
There certainly can be no question from the evidence 
in this case that plaintiff came out of the police car at 
a high rate of speed and knocked or pushed both officers 
aside in an apparent attempt to enter his automobile 
and leave the area (R. 273, 334, 339, and 318). There 
was nothing the officers could do under the circumstances 
except to stop him, and Instruction No. 8 fairly and 
adequately informed the jury that the amount of force 
and restraint used must be only the degree of force that 
the officers believe they had reasonable grounds for 
using and that amount of force that appeared necessary 
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to these defendants. The first blow struck by Officer 
Jacobson was not struck until after both he and Officer 
Lang had a hold of each arm of the plaintiff and were 
leading him back to the car and the plaintiff broke loose 
(R. 275), and this blow was certainly not very severe 
because it had no apparent effect on the plaintiff what-
soever and only seemed to rile him more (R. 276). Then 
Officer Jacobson managed to get a handcuff on one arm 
(R. 278), and plaintiff broke that arm free and in swing-
ing and flailing it about cut Officer Jacobson quite a 
little bit (R. 463), and then and only then did Officer 
Lang hit him with the flashlight (R. 279). These blows 
were not severe or brutal and were not intended to injure 
plaintiff (R. 380). The minute both handcuffs were 
secured to the plaintiff's arms, all physical activity 
against him ceased (R. 381). As we will demonstrate un-
der our own Point II, the plaintiff was not severely in-
jured at all, and the truth of the matter is that these 
officers had no intention or design to injure the plaintiff 
and actually did a very good job of placing an extremely 
violent and powerful man under control without hurting 
him. 
Plaintiff's Point V 
This point in regard to the malicious prosecution 
cause of action will be discussed under respondents' 
Point III at Page 38 of this brief. 
Plaintiff's Point VI 
All the defendant officers were expressly charged 
with malice and punitive damages were sought. There-
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fore, it certainly was permissible to show what was 
actually in their minds and what their frame of mind 
was on the night in question. The fact that they were 
patrolling an extremely dangerous area and were under 
specific instructions to completely check every suspicious 
situation (R. 403) certainly would be highly material and 
relevant on the question of malice, and, therefore, the 
evidence of Chief Skousen in this respect was permissable 
and proper in every sense. See also the comments of the 
Court below on this point at R. 401. 
Plain tiff's Point VII 
Throughout the trial plaintiff's attorney persistently 
and flagrantly in express violation of repeated rulings 
by the trial Court attempted to read from certain records 
and reports made by the police officers in connection 
with their departmental reports about the incident. The 
proper use of these documents as a basis of cross-
examination and impeach1nent is not doubted, but they 
were not used for that purpose by plaintiff. Plaintiff's 
counsel persisted in an attempt to capitalize on 
certain grammatical errors or stilted language used in 
the reports by the defendants and to ridicule their ability 
to write. The conduct of plaintiff's counsel in persisting 
in these tactics throughout the trial was clearly improper, 
and he was able, in the judgment of attorney for respnd-
ents, to successfully convey to the jury the notion that 
perhaps there was something in those reports that de-
fendants were trying to hide. Therefore, Officer Jacob-
son's primary report "Exhibit 20'' and Officer Lang's 
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report "Exhibit 22" were admitted by respondents 
withdrawing their objections to the previous offerings. 
(R. 305, R. 376). It is submitted and perfectly apparent 
from all the reports that there is no material variance 
whatever in the information given in the officers' reports 
from their evidence at the trial. 
The booking sheet "Exhibit 23" was simply the book-
ing officers's version of what had been said to him by 
defendant officers and in no sense constituted any 
statement by them which was admissable for any purpose 
in this lawsuit and was properly excluded by the Court. 
Exhibits 19 and 21 which were not admitted by the Court, 
are merely written reports originally submitted by the 
officers as departmental record and do not purport to set 
forth the full and complete details of what occurred-
they are secondary evidence and were not admissable 
under any theory propounded by plaintiff. 
A reading of Rule 43 (b) shows that there was no 
irregularity in defendants cross-examination by their 
own counsel after they had been called by plaintiff. The 
rule expressly authorizes such cross-exmnination- and 
in any event no unfair advantage was taken of plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's Point VIII 
Plaintiff complains that the ·Court's conduct was 
prejudicial to hin1. Nothing could more clearly illustrate 
the belligerent disposition of the plaintiff than his conduct 
at his own trial. The truth of the matter is that the 
trial judge exhibited patience almost beyond belief before 
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he finally was forced to reprimand the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff was determined in this case to sound off and 
volunteer his own statements regardless of what ques-
tions were asked him and regardless of admonitions from 
the Court. No less than seventeen times during the 
course of the trial it was necessary for the Court to 
instruct the plaintiff to stop volunteering answers and 
to confine himself to the qeustions asked (R. 112, 114, 
119, 123, 128, 129, 134, 135, 138, 139, 141, 143, 169, 170, 
202, 210, 211). At R. 143, the plaintiff in a very insolent 
tone argued with the Court and told the Court that he 
was trying to be helpful. At R. 211 the Court finally 
administered the reprimand to the plaintiff that is 
complained of in plaintiff's brief. It is impossible to tell 
from the printed record exactly what the tone of voice 
was that was being used, but the Court's reporter from 
the top of R. 211 to the bottom of R .. 211 did a remarkable 
job of reporting because what really happened was that 
the Court began to reprimand and instruct the plaintiff, 
and all the answers as shown at R. 211 by plaintiff were 
out and out interruptions of the Court's statements. 
The Court was attempting to make a statement 
and an instruction and a reprimand to plaintiff, and plain-
- ' tiff in a rude .and belligerent fashion kept butting in to 
the remarks that the Court was making. Plaintiff was 
lucky that he didn't get punished for contempt as a result 
of this incident. 
There is little need to cite extensive authority for 
the propsition that the trial Court is certainly entitled, 
indeed has a duty, to keep the proceedings in his Court 
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orderly and to keep witnesses within proper bounds. The 
trial Court was well within his bounds of discretion in 
this incident, and the attempt on the part of plaintiff to 
now capitalize on his own misbehavior is typical of his 
conduct in the entire lawsuit. At 53 American Juris-
prudence under the heading TRIAL at Section 7 4 found 
at Page 73 of said volume there is an excellent discussion 
relating to the conduct of the judge at trial. Section 81 
at Page 79 of said volume deals with the conduct of the 
Court toward witnesses. The authorities there discussed 
show that without question the Court was entirely justi-
fied in his reprimand to the plaintiff. It was not even 
necessary for the Court to make the comments to the jury 
with respect to the incident that he did at R. 298, 299, but 
the trial Court wanted to be completely fair to the plain-
tiff, and, therefore, made these remarks. 
Plaintiff's Point IX 
The matter of the defendants' judgment for attor-
ney's fees against the plaintiff will be discussed In 
respondents' Point IV at Page 41 of this brief. 
POINT II 
PLAIN'TIFF DID NOT RECEIVE A SEVERE BEATING 
OR ANYTHING APPROACHING IT AND WAS ONLY SUPER-
FICIALLY IN JURED IN THE LAWFUL EFFORTS OF THE 
DEFENDANT OFFICERS TO RETAIN HIM IN CUSTODY. 
Dr. Marshall S. Decker, the obstetrician who examined 
and treated the plaintiff, testified (R. 183) that he ex-
mnined and treated the plaintiff on the 6th day of April, 
1958. He testified that the plaintiff had bruises on the 
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shoulders, under the left armpit, over the right loin, 
and over the sacroiliac region (R. 184). Plaintiff within 
a day or two after the incident had large photographs 
taken of himself purporting to illustrate his tremendous 
injury, and these photographs were introduced as "Ex-
hibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 ." The bruises mentioned by the 
doctor do not appear in these photographs. Since the 
plaintiff had large photographs taken of apparently 
every scratch he could find on him, it seems fair to 
assume that if these bruises had amounted to anything, 
he would have had pictures taken of them. However, he 
that as it may, the bruises are not shown in the photo-
graphs. The doctor further testified that there were 
abrasions and lacerations around the ankles and on both 
knees and kneecaps. The "wound" on the left ankle is 
shown on "Exhibit 5," and "Exhibits 4 and 7" show the 
ankle wounds on the right .ankle. The damage to the knees 
and the kneecaps is not shown. The doctor testified that 
he found only two incisive wounds as opposed to abrasive 
wounds on the head of plaintiff (R. 185), and at R. 187 
he said that those wounds appeared to be the same 
wounds as shown on plaintiff's "Exhibit 2" and also 
testified that the plaintiff had a bruise on the upper lid 
of his eye. This is shown on plaintiff's "Exhibit 3." 
Plaintiff's "Exhibit 6" presumably shows the rest of the 
head wounds that he received from what has been char-
acterized in his brief from an unmerciful and brutal 
beating. We submit these photographs to the Court for 
examination without further comment on the severity 
of these wounds. 
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The doctor also testified that he thought the plain-
tiff's nose was broken .and that it should be x-rayed to 
determine that, (R. 185). Plaintiff's "Exhibits 3 and 6" 
taken a day or two after the incident illustrate his nose. 
The appearance of the plaintiff's nose at the trial did 
not appear one bit different than it does in these photo-
graphs, and the jury must certainly have observed that 
fact. The plaintiff testified that his nose was indeed 
broken and that it was set at the Veterans Hospital, · 
but he produced no x-rays and no witnesses whatsoever 
to testify to or verify this treatment. It would seem that 
if his nose had indeed been broken or (deviated) that 
this was his most serious physical damage, and if the 
proof was available it should have been presented. 
However, there was no evidence at .all introduced by the 
plaintiff other than the observations of Dr. Decker with-
out benefit of x-rays. Plaintiff did not submit any evi-
dence of medical expenses and claimed no item of special 
damages in this connection. 
POINT III 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE THIRD CAUSE OF AC-
TION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION SHOULD NOT LIE 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE, AND IN ANY 
EVENT, THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY DE-
FENDANTS AT THE TRIAL .CLEARLY ESTABLISHED A 
DEFENSE TO ANY SUCH CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THE 
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT ERRONEOUS. 
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence in the trial 
(R. 394) defendants made a n1otion to the Court to dis-
miss the plaintiff's third cause of action for malicious 
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prosecution on the ground that the action was not main-
tainable against the defendant police officers as a matter 
of law. At 28 A.L.R. (2d) Page 646 there appears the 
recent and latest annotation on the question of the civil 
liability of law enforcement officers for malicious prose-
cution. This is an excellent annotation, and it shows with-
out question that the doctrine of immunity from suit is 
being extended to law enforcement officers in the various 
states whenever the question directly arises. The annota-
tion discusses at length the pros and cons on the proposi-
tion of immunity. The prime case which heads the anno-
tation is White v. Towers, 37 California (2d) 727, 235 
Pac. (2d) 209; 28 A.L.R. (2d) 636. This is an excellent 
case, and we submit that this is a matter of first impres-
sion in this Court, and the Court should follow the Cali-
fornia view in accordance with the majority view as set 
forth in the annotation. See in particular Sub-para-
graph 2 of the annotation at Page 649. The California 
Court says, at Page 640 under headnote 3 in the A.L.R. 
citation, the following: 
"We .are aware of the fact that in thus sur-
rounding peace officers with immunity in cases 
of this sort, hardship may result to some individu-
als. However, experience has shown that the com-
mon good is best served by permitting law en-
forcement officers to perform their assigned tasks 
without fear of being called to account in a civil ac-
tion for alleged malicious prosecution. The doc-
trine of immunity from liability for allegedly mali-
cious acts has long been established with respect 
to numerous public officers. In the early case of 
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 20 L. Ed. 646, the 
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doctrine was applied to judges of courts of record. 
'The rule finds its genesis in the necessary protec-
tion of courts in the impartial, uninfluenced dis-
charge of judicial duties.' Phelps v. Dawson, 
supra, 8 Cir., 97 F2d 339, 340, 116 ALR 1343. Since 
that time it has been recognized that the orderly 
administration of the affairs of government neces-
sitates the inclusion of many officials within the 
cloak of immunity." (Cites cases) 
Respondents submit that this Court should determine 
in this case that malicious prosecution suits do not and 
should not lie against law enforcement officers. Even in 
the event that this Court does not see fit to adopt the 
California and the majority rule, the facts and evidence 
produced by defendants at the trial clearly established 
a defense to any such cause of action, and the court's in-
structions to the jury on this cause were not in error. 
Plaintiff complains of Instruction Nos. 18, 19, and 
21. These Instructions are all based on the restatement 
on the Law of Torts in the volume containing Sections 
504-756 and entitled "Torts Absolute Liability, Deceit, 
Defamation, Disparagement, Unjustifiable Litigation, 
etc." Instruction No. 18 is supported by the restatement 
discussion under Section 657, cmnment (a) and (b) at 
Page 393 of said restatement volume. Instruction No. 19 
is based on Sections 662 and 665 of the said restatement 
volume, and Instruction No. 21 is based on Section 653. 
These restatement principles are not in conflict with any 
of the Utah cases cited, and the evidence is clear that none 
of the defendants except Jacobson ever instituted any 
proceedings before anyone, either by way of signing a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
complaint or procuring a complaint or even discussing 
the matter with any prosecuting authority. Officer Jacob-
son took the responsibility for signing complaints. Officer 
Jacobson did sign a complaint charging plaintiff with 
assault, a complaint charging him with battery (R. 238) 
and with the offense of resisting and obstructing (R. 445). 
Officer Jacobson did not have anything to do with the 
filing of any drunk or vagrancy charges. 
The testimony of Mr. Melvin H. Morris, the City 
Prosecutor, clearly establishes that Officer J acohson 
made a full and fair disclosure of all the facts of the in-
cident, and Prosecutor Morris felt that the complaints 
were justified and recommended them (R. 444, 446, 448, 
et. seq.). In all events there could have been no possible 
prejudice to plaintiff on the malicious prosecution act 
because as the Court told the jury in Instruction No. 18 
that if the plaintiff actually did commit the offenses 
charged against him by the defendants then such a find-
ing would be a cmnplete defense and this, of course, is the 
law everywhere and is followed by the Restatement of 
Torts, Section 657. 
POINT IV 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DE-
FENDANTS IS NOT SUFFICIENT UNDER THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AND IN VIEW OF THE APPLICABLE LAW 
APPLIED BY THE COURT BELOW. 
78-11-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as 
follows: 
* * * "In the event judgment in the said 
cause shall be against the plaintiff for the pay-
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ment to the defendant of all costs and expenses 
that may be awarded against such plaintiff includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee to be fiXed by the 
Court." 
In the Court's judgment for attorney's fees found 
at R. 98, the Court said that in view of the apparent fi-
nancial circumstances on both sides in the action, the 
Court was of the opinion that it should hold the awarding 
of attorney's fees to a minimum and that the judgment 
should be based upon such consideration rather than on 
what attorney's fees should be if the Court considered 
the actual, reasonable value of attorney's services ren-
dered in the case. It is submitted that the statute does 
not lend itself to this interpretation. It should be con-
strued to the effect that attorney's fees shall be reason-
able and just according to what such services were worth. 
The evidence on attorney's fees (R. 94-98) shows 
that a minim urn time of 26 hours were spent by attorney 
for defendants in interviewing witnesses in preparation 
for trial and that 45 hours were devoted to researching 
the law on the case as it applied to the 3 causes of action 
and their intertwining nature. The evidence was that 
$25.00 an hour was the usual charge of said attorney 
for this work, but in this case $20.00 an hour was all that 
was being requested. The evidence further showed that 
pre-trial hearing was held and in the opinion of the attor-
ney $75.00 was a reasonable amount for that hearing. 
The evidence further showed that the trial of th,e case 
consumed four actual days in trial and one full day on 
Sunday in the middle of the trial reviewing transcripts 
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with the court reporte-r and finishing work on instruc-
tions. The recommended average fee schedule of the 
County Bar Association states that a reasonable fee for 
trial is $200.00 per day. Defendants' attorney requested 
only $150.00 a day from the Court. Finally the evidence 
of defendants was that in view of the total time spent, 
length of the trial, and result achieved, $2700.00 was a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
It is submitted that plaintiff's entire lawsuit was com-
pletely unjustified, that he was clearly in the wrong, that 
he forced the officers into a position where they were re-
quired to defend an expensive and lengthy trial, and there 
is no basis for giving any special consideration to the 
plaintiff in view of the provisions of 78-11-10. It is fur-
ther submitted that this Court should increase the award 
of attorney's fees to $2700.00 and make an additional 
award for a reasonable fee to the defendants in connec-
tion with this appeal. 
POINT V 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO RESERVE OFFICER DOUG-
LAS. 
At the close of the plaintiff's case, Defendant Douglas 
(R. 394) moved the Court to grant a judgment of dis-
missal upon the grounds that said defendant took no part 
and engaged in no assault or battery upon the plaintiff, 
made no arrest or imprisonment of the plaintiff and par-
ticipated in no manner which would result in any liability 
against him and upon the further ground that it appeared 
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that he at all times was acting pursuant to the instruc-
tions and directions of a duly authorized police officer 
of Salt Lake City who was his superior officer at all times 
pertinent. ' 
It is submitted to the ·Court that this position is well 
taken. Defendant Douglas was a reserve officer in train-
ing. He was under the direct supervision and control of 
Officer Jacobson who was his superior officer in charge 
(R. 402, 410). 
Plaintiff maintains that because Douglas was present 
and would have been willing to assist the officers that he 
was, therefore, aiding and abetting. It is submitted that 
in view of the relationship between Douglas and his 
superior officer and his duties in connection therewith, 
that such a doctrine should not be applicable to defendant 
Douglas, and the Court below should have granted the 
Motion to Dismiss with respect to him. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff in this case had a full, fair trial. The trial 
itself lasted four days. Plaintiff had every opportunity 
and indeed took every opportunity to give his side of the 
story. The jury chose to accept the officers' version of 
the story. The jury had the best opportunity to listen 
to and observe the parties and decide where the truth 
and the justice of the case lay. They emphatically decided 
against the plaintiff, and plaintiff has not suggested any 
valid reasons why these defendant police officers should 
be forced to go back into Court and submit to additional 
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lengthy and expensive litigation. The defendants in this 
case were excellent police officers. Under the facts and 
circumstancs of this case, it is hard to see what other 
course of action they could have pursued other than the 
one they did. The plaintiff was determined to make 
trouble and give them a bad time. Because of his actions 
and conduct, one thing led to another until the entire 
situation became quite serious. The offenses committed 
by the plaintiff on that night were serious and unjustified. 
There was no excuse for the way he acted and for the 
the things he did, and he in no way conducted himself 
as a decent and responsible citizen on that evening. It 
would be a tremendous injustice if this Court were to 
disturb the judgment of the Court and jury below and 
permit plaintiff to continue this unjustifiable litigation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR. 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents 
411 Utah Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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